We analyze the effects of different resale mechanisms on bidders' strategies in multi-object uniform-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. Our experimental design consists of four treatments: one without resale and three resale treatments that vary the information available and the bargaining mechanism in the resale market. The presence of a resale market induces demand reduction by high-value bidders and speculation by low-value bidders, thus affecting the allocation of the objects on sale. The magnitude of these effects, however, depends on the form of the resale market. Features of the resale market that tend to increase its efficiency result in lower auction efficiency and seller's revenue. We also show that, without resale, asymmetry among bidders reduces demand reduction.
Introduction
Auctions are often characterized by the possibility of resale by winning bidders, which may dramatically alter the outcome from what would have been observed without resale. U.S. Treasury Bills and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program to sell CO 2 allowances are two economically relevant examples of auctions with an active resale market. Resale was explicitly forbidden in the …rst U.S. and European spectrum auctions, but since 2003 in almost all spectrum auctions bidders are allowed to trade the licenses acquired. It is now relatively common to observe small bidders winning and reselling to larger ones. 1 This change in policy was intended to favour a more e¢ cient allocation of the spectrum among its users.
Post-auction resale may emerge because of bidders'strategic behavior in the auction. Specifically, in multi-object auctions bidders have an incentive to reduce demand -i.e., bid less than their valuations for marginal units, in order to reduce the auction price for inframarginal units. 2 There is substantial experimental evidence of demand reduction by symmetric bidders in auctions without resale (e.g., Kagel and Levin, 2001, 2005 ; List and Lucking-Reiley, 2000; Engelmann and Grimm, 2009). Moreover, Weber (1997) , Wolfram (1998) , and Wolak (2003) empirically show that demand reduction a¤ected several FCC spectrum auctions, as well as the UK and the California electricity markets; while Klemperer (2004) describes demand reduction strategies in the 1999 German and the 2000 Austrian spectrum auctions. 3 Demand reduction reduces the seller's revenue and may result in an ine¢ cient allocation of the objects on sale, in which case bidders will be willing to trade after the auction if they are allowed to do so. The possibility of resale, however, may exacerbate bidders' incentive to reduce demand, since it provides them with a chance to acquire a unit that they do not win in the auction. 4 In addition, the presence of a post-auction resale market may induce lowvalue bidders to speculate by bidding aggressively, which further increases the likelihood of an ine¢ cient auction allocation.
The recent empirical literature on single-object auctions with resale shows that subjects integrate the strategic e¤ects of a resale market in their bidding behavior (Haile, 2001 ; Georganas, 2011; Lange et al., 2011; Saral, 2012) . Much less is known, however, about bidder's actual behavior in more complex auction environments with multiple objects on sale and resale.
Speci…cally, it is unclear whether the presence of a resale market helps correct the ine¢ ciencies resulting from demand reduction, or if it increases bidders'strategic behavior, thus resulting in a more ine¢ cient auction allocation that may not be corrected by resale.
In this paper, we address the following questions: How does the possibility of resale in multi-object auctions a¤ect bidders'strategies, e¢ ciency and the seller's revenue? Should resale be allowed? If so, how should the resale market be structured? A combination of theoretical and experimental analysis allows us to analyze actual subjects'behavior under di¤erent resale conditions and compare it with the theoretical predictions. 5 We consider a uniform-price auction with two identical units on sale and two asymmetric bidders, one strong and one weak. The strong bidder has a higher valuation and demands both units; the weak bidder has a lower valuation and demands only one unit. 6 Considering bidders with di¤erent characteristics allows us to distinguish the di¤erent bidding strategies that they adopt in the auction (i.e., demand reduction by strong bidders and speculation by weak bidders), and the di¤erent e¤ects that the presence of a resale market has on these strategies.
Actual resale markets take on a variety of forms, including di¤erent formal trading mechanisms as well as informal bargaining. Since bidders'ability to trade depends on the characteristics of the resale market, di¤erent characteristics are likely to have di¤erent e¤ects on bidders' strategies. In our theoretical environment resale takes place through a post-auction bargaining procedure in which bidders share the gains from trade in the resale market. Many di¤erent resale mechanisms are consistent with this set-up, which allows us to obtain uniform theoretical predictions across the experimental treatments.
Our controlled laboratory experiments consist of four treatments: No Resale, Complete Information Resale, Incomplete Information Resale, and Bargain. In the no resale treatment subjects participated in an ascending auction without resale. The complete information and incomplete information resale treatments included a secondary market where one bidder was randomly chosen to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. 7 In the …rst of these treatments, subjects were given complete information regarding the competitors'values in the resale market, while in the second, information was restricted to the distribution of the competitors'values. In the bargain treatment, information continued to be restricted to the distribution of values, but both bidders were allowed to make multiple o¤ers and to communicate through computerized chat in a resale stage. 8 While the complete and incomplete information resale treatments consider a static and more structured resale mechanism, the bargain treatment replicates a more ‡exible, 5 We use experiments due to the di¢ culty of observing bidders'values, controlling whether resale is possible, and controlling the form of the resale market with …eld data. While our experiments allow a causal examination of the impact of resale on behavior, they do so in an arti…cial and simpli…ed context. We discuss these limitations in the conclusions. 6 For example, in an auction for geographically di¤erentiated mobile phone licenses, a strong bidder can be interpreted as an incumbent operator who aims at acquiring a nationwide license, while a weak bidder can be interpreted as a new and smaller entrant, possibly interested only in a local license, or even as a pure speculator. 7 This resale mechanism was analyzed by Calzolari and Pavan (2006) . 8 We are the …rst to implement an unstructured bargaining game for a post-auction resale market. Feltovich and Swierzbinski (2011) use a similar approach for cheap talk. Our treatment is based on the classic structure of early bargaining experiments (e.g. Roth and Malouf, 1979) where anonymous participants were allowed to freely communicate. We also vary the information that participants have about each other's payo¤s as in Roth and Murningham (1982) . For experimental surveys of communication see Crawford (1998) and of bargaining see Roth (1995) . and arguably more realistic, bargaining procedure.
In the baseline treatment without resale, consistent with the theoretical predictions, asymmetry among bidders' valuations makes demand reduction less attractive (because it is more costly to lose an object for a bidder with a higher valuation, and less costly to outbid a competitor with a lower valuation). Speci…cally, strong bidders drop out at low prices with much lower frequency when their valuation is relatively high. 9 Our main result is that, regardless of how we implement the resale market and consistent with the theoretical predictions, resale induces strong bidders to increase demand reduction.
Indeed, in all resale treatments strong bidders tend to drop out at low prices regardless of their valuations, and they do so signi…cantly more than without resale. This suggests that with resale high-value bidders prefer to allow low-value ones to win one of the objects and then try to acquire it in the resale market, rather than outbid them. However, the level of demand reduction depends on the form of the resale market: in the incomplete information resale treatment strong bidders reduce demand less than in the other resale treatments, arguably because of the higher uncertainty due to a less ‡exible trading mechanism with lower information.
Weak bidders bid up to their value without resale and the addition of a resale market signi…cantly increases their bids, because winning the auction has the additional option value of providing an opportunity to resell (e.g., . 10 Similar to the response of strong bidders, the degree of speculation by weak bidders depends on the speci…c structure of the resale market.
Weak bidders are signi…cantly more aggressive in the complete information resale treatment than in the other resale treatments.
It is often argued that resale after an auction should be allowed because it increases e¢ ciency by allowing bidders to trade if they are willing to do so in the presence of gains from trade (e.g., Mankiw, 2007) , but our analysis suggests this may not always be the case. Although resale does increase e¢ ciency after the auction, it also increases the level of demand reduction which reduces auction e¢ ciency below what is observed without resale. Moreover, the net e¤ect of resale on e¢ ciency is ambiguous: resale increases …nal allocative e¢ ciency only in the complete information and bargain treatments. Final e¢ ciency in the incomplete information and no resale treatments is similar.
The net e¤ect of resale on revenue is also ambiguous. In theory, allowing resale should always reduce the seller's revenue due to demand reduction by strong bidders. Our experimental results, however, indicate that resale increases the seller's revenue when strong bidders do not reduce demand since weak bidders bid more aggressively with resale, which raises the auction price. 9 This complements previous experimental results on demand reduction by symmetric bidders without resale (Alsemgeest et al., 1998; Kagel and Levin, 2001, 2005 ; Engelmann and Grimm, 2009; Goeree et al., 2013).
1 0 Weak bidders bidding up to their value without resale parallels experimental results in single-object ascending auctions (e.g., Coppinger et al., 1980; Kagel et al., 1987 ; and see Kagel, 1995 , for a comprehensive overview), and con…rms the robustness of value bidding in a multi-object ascending auctions (McCabe et al., 1990) . See Kagel and Levin (2011) and Kwasnica and Sherstyuk (2012) for recent surveys of experimental results in multiobject auctions. Weak bidders speculating with resale mirrors the experimental results for single-object auctions (Georganas, 2011; Georganas and Kagel, 2011 ).
On balance, the seller's revenue without resale is similar to the revenue in the complete and incomplete information resale treatments, but signi…cantly higher than in the bargain treatment. 
Model and Theoretical Predictions
We construct the simplest possible model that allows us to experimentally investigate the e¤ects of resale on bidding strategies by asymmetric bidders, and on their incentives to reduce demand and speculate.
Auction. There is a (sealed-bid) uniform-price auction for 2 units of an identical good, with no reserve price (footnote 22 discusses the e¤ect of a positive reserve price): the 2 highest bids are awarded the units; and the winner(s) pay a price equal to the 3 rd -highest bid for each unit won.
Bidders only observe the auction price, and not the opponents'bids, at the end of the auction.
We consider a uniform-price auction because it is the auction mechanism in which the incentive to reduce demand arises more clearly and because it is widely used to allocate multiple objects. 11 The qualitative results of the analysis, however, also hold for any mechanism to allocate multiple units in which players face a trade-o¤ between winning more units and paying lower prices. The auction may be followed by a resale market.
Bidders and Valuations. There are 2 risk-neutral asymmetric bidders. Bidders di¤er both in the number of units that they demand, and in their valuations for those units. Speci…cally, bidder S, the strong bidder, demands 2 units and has valuation v S U v S ; v S for each unit on sale (i.e., he has ‡at demand); 12 bidder W , the weak bidder, demands 1 unit only and has valuation v W U v W ; v W for that unit. Bidders are privately informed about their valuations, which are independent. We assume that v S v W , implying that bidder S always has a higher valuation than bidder W , and that bidders know the ex-post e¢ cient allocation of the units on sale before the auction. For simplicity, we also assume that bidder W cannot win more than 1 unit in the auction, even if resale is allowed. 13 Hence, bidder S submits two bids in the auction (which may be di¤erent) and bidder W submits one bid only.
Our assumption on bidders' valuations ensures that in our experiments bidders know the role they will have in the resale market when they bid in the auction -i.e., whether they will have a chance to buy or sell in the resale market -allowing us to focus on the di¤erent bidding strategies of the two types of bidders and on how these strategies are a¤ected by the possibility of resale. The assumption also implies that bidders know there are gains from trade in the resale market if W wins a unit.
Resale Market. When resale is allowed after the auction, if bidder W wins a unit he can resell it to bidder S. In contrast to previous experiments on auctions with resale that assume di¤erent and more structured resale markets, 14 we consider resale through a general bargaining procedure between bidders. We believe that this is a more realistic representation of many real-life situations in which bidders attempt to trade after an auction but do not follow a formal trading mechanism (e.g., because no bidder has the bargaining power to impose his preferred trading mechanism).
Rather than analyzing each bargaining mechanism used in our experiment, we provide a simple framework that captures the main elements of various resale mechanisms in which both bidders expect to obtain some share of the (expected) gains from trade in the resale market.
The actual gains from trade in the resale market are v S v W , since W 's outside option when he trades in the resale market is equal to his valuation, while S's outside option is zero. We assume that bargaining in the resale market results in S obtaining a share of the gains from trade and W obtaining a share 1 of the gains from trade. 15 This bargaining outcome follows 1 2 All our qualitative results also hold in the presence of complementarities, although bidder S's incentive to reduce demand is lower in this case if there is a chance that he may not manage to acquire the second unit in the resale market. 1 3 We chose to restrict bidder W to single-unit demand to create a simple experimental environment where subject confusion is unlikely, thus eliminating potential confounding e¤ects. This also facilitates the comparison between the weak bidders' behavior with and without resale. Even if bidder W can win 2 units when resale is allowed, it is an equilibrium for both bidders to reduce demand, as in our model. See footnote 21. Saral (2012) assume automatic transfers to bidders with higher valuations. 1 5 We assume that bidders manage to trade when it is common knowledge that there are gains from trade and, hence, that the resale market is e¢ cient. In bargaining with incomplete information, e¢ ciency is possible when players'valuations have non-overlapping supports (e.g., Ausubel et al., 2002) , as in our model. 6 from bidders trading at a resale price
and it can be interpreted as a reduced-form representation of the …nal outcome of various di¤erent trading mechanisms. Our qualitative results are robust to many alternative models of the resale market and hold for any sharing < 1.
In our experiments, we consider di¤erent bargaining mechanisms for the resale market (see Section 3). In one mechanism, if bidder W wins a unit in the auction, bidders are allowed to freely bargain over the resale price. In another mechanism, one of the two bidders, chosen randomly, is given the possibility of making a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the other bidder (Calzolari and Pavan, 2006) . 16 In all of these mechanisms, both bidders expect to obtain some share of the gains from trade in the resale market, which is the feature that drives all our theoretical results.
In order to show that our qualitative results do not hinge on the resale market being fully e¢ cient, in Appendix A we analyze a resale market with incomplete information in which one bidder is randomly selected to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, corresponding to our "incomplete information" experimental treatment.
Bidding Strategies. There is demand reduction if a bidder bids less than his valuation for a unit, while there is speculation if a bidder bids more than his valuation for a unit. In a uniform-price auction, bidder S may …nd it pro…table to reduce demand and bid less than his valuation for the second unit in order to pay a lower price for the …rst unit, thus obtaining a higher pro…t. The logic is the same as the standard textbook logic for a monopsonist withholding demand: buying an additional unit increases the price paid for the …rst, inframarginal, units. Moreover, when resale is allowed, bidder W may …nd it pro…table to speculate and bid more than his valuation in the auction, if he expects to resell the item.
Because our model has 2 units on sale and a total demand for 3 units, to characterize equilibrium bidding strategies it will be su¢ cient to describe W 's bid for one unit, and S's bid for the second unit. The lowest of these two bids will be the auction price, and either S will win both units on sale at a price equal to W 's bid, or the two bidders will win one unit each at a price equal to S's bid. When bidder W wins a unit, the auction allocation is ine¢ cient.
Auction without Resale
In an auction without resale, it is a weakly dominant strategy for bidder W to bid his valuation for a unit -i.e., v W . Given this strategy, bidder S can outbid W and win two units at an expected price E [v W ], or he can reduce demand and bid 0 for the second unit, thus winning one 1 6 With complete information, this second resale mechanism, in which in expectation bidders obtain 1 2 of the gains from trade in the resale market, is a special case of our class of bargaining mechanisms, when = 1 2 . 7 unit only at price 0. 17 Therefore, bidder S prefers to reduce demand if and only if
When resale is not allowed, bidder S's incentive to reduce demand in the auction is lower when he has a relatively high valuation, because reducing demand and not winning the second unit is more costly when that unit is more valuable, or when he expects bidder W to have a low valuation and hence to bid less aggressively, because outbidding bidder W to win the second unit is less costly. 
Auction with Resale
When resale is possible, a player's "willingness to pay" for a unit in the auction is represented by the price at which he expects to buy or sell a unit in the resale market.
By assumption, if bidder W wins a unit in the auction, he obtains an actual surplus equal
for a unit on sale in the auction. 18 Notice that this can be interpreted as E [ rj v W ], the price at which bidder W expects to sell to bidder S in the resale market. Bidder W speculates because of the option to resell to bidder S and bids higher than his valuation for a unit, and hence higher than without resale.
Since bidder W bids his expected resale price in the auction, bidder S has a choice between two alternatives. First, bidder S can outbid bidder W and win 2 units in the auction at an expected auction price equal to
thus obtaining an expected pro…t equal to
Second, bidder S can reduce demand and bid zero for the second unit in the auction, thus winning one unit at price 0 in the auction and then buying the second unit from bidder W in 1 7 Of course, reducing demand but bidding a strictly positive price is never an optimal strategy. 1 8 If W wins a unit in the auction at price p, he obtains an expected pro…t equal to vW p + (1 ) E [ vS vW j vW ]; while if W loses the auction, he obtains 0. So he bids a price such that his pro…t from winning is equal to zero. resale market at an expected resale price equal to
In this case, S obtains an expected total pro…t equal to 19
Comparing (2.1) and (2.2), bidder S prefers to reduce demand in the auction when resale is allowed if and only if
Since this inequality is always satis…ed for every and for every v S , bidder S prefers to reduce demand when resale is allowed. 20 Basically, bidder S is willing to bid a much lower price in the auction because of the option to buy in the resale market. And demand reduction allows bidder S to win 1 unit at price 0 in the auction and then purchase the other unit from bidder W at price r in the resale market, rather than pay bidder W 's expected resale price for both units in the auction. 21 The …rst option is more attractive than the second (unless bidder S expects the resale price to be much higher than bidder W , which can be the case when v S is very high compared to its ex-ante expected value -see footnote 20 -but this never happens when bidder S's valuation is uniformly distributed). 22 As a result, when resale is allowed, S and W win one unit each and then trade in the resale market. The auction price is equal to 0. (Of course, this can also be interpreted as tacit collusion among bidders, intended to reduce the seller's revenue.)
Summing up, the theoretical predictions of the model that we test using experimental methodology are the following. Result 3. The allocation of the units on sale in the auction is more e¢ cient without resale than with resale. The …nal allocation is more e¢ cient with resale than without resale. 23 Result 4. The expected seller's revenue is lower with resale than without resale.
Experimental Design
The experiment was designed around three primary objectives: We implemented four treatments, one benchmark treatment without resale, and three with di¤erent resale mechanisms. The resale mechanisms were designed to evaluate the e¤ects of di¤erent levels of information and di¤erent trading procedures. Each session of the experiment consisted of a single treatment, and each subject participated in a single session. Subjects were randomly assigned to either the role of weak or strong bidder for the duration of the experiment.
In all treatments, each period began with an ascending clock uniform-price auction for two units of a hypothetical good. 24 Each auction always had 1 strong and 1 weak bidder. The strong bidder was allowed to purchase up to 2 units, and randomly drew his private valuation for each unit from a uniform distribution on the range [30; 50] . The weak bidder could purchase 1 unit, and randomly drew his private valuation from a uniform distribution on the range [10; 30] .
Throughout the experiment, the strong bidder was referred to as a 2-unit bidder and the weak bidder as a 1-unit bidder to minimize labeling e¤ects. During the auction each bidder was given information about the distribution of his competitor's valuation and the number of units he demanded.
Bidders participated in the auction through a computer interface with a bid clock gradually increasing from 0 in increments of 1, which indicated the auction price for a unit. To bid in the auction, subjects chose to "drop out"when the clock reached a price at which they wanted to exit the auction. The auction ended as soon as one bidder dropped out, and the auction price paid for each unit was equal to the dropout bid. If neither subject dropped out, the auction ended at price 50, and the units were awarded randomly. If both subjects dropped out simultaneously, ties were broken randomly. A bidder who won a unit earned the di¤erence between his value and the auction price.
In the three resale treatments, if the weak bidder won a unit, the resale market immediately started with the same participants from the auction. Two resale treatments involved a take-itor-leave-it o¤er where the proposer was determined with 50/50 probability. If the weak (strong) bidder was selected as the proposer, he had the opportunity to o¤er a buy (sell) price to the other bidder, who could then accept or reject the o¤er. Neither of these two treatments allowed communication between bidders, and the sole di¤erence involved the amount of information conveyed. In one case, bidders received complete information of the competitor's valuation after the auction; in the other, bidders only knew the distribution of the competitor's valuation.
The third resale treatment relaxed the no communication and one-shot o¤er constraints by implementing an unstructured bargaining game where both bidders could communicate and simultaneously make o¤ers through a computerized o¤er board. 25 One posted o¤er per participant was allowed at a time, but o¤ers could always be changed prior to agreement. Either bidder could accept the o¤er made by their counterpart and the resale stage terminated once an o¤er was accepted. Bidders could also send each other messages through anonymous chat.
There was a time limit of 3 minutes to reach agreement. 26 As in the incomplete information treatment, bidders only knew the distribution of the competitor's valuation.
In all resale treatments, bidders could exit the resale market without trading at any point of their choosing. If a resale o¤er was agreed upon, the weak bidder earned the di¤erence between the resale price and his value, and the strong bidder earned the di¤erence between his value and the resale price. If resale failed, both bidders earned 0. Any resale earnings were in addition to the earnings from the auction. The treatments are summarized below.
1. No Resale: Subjects only participated in the auction.
Complete Information Resale (Comp Resale):
If the weak bidder won a unit in the auction, each bidder's valuation was revealed to the competitor and one bidder was randomly chosen to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the other.
Incomplete Information Resale (Incomp Resale): This treatment was identical to
the complete information resale treatment, except that the competitor's valuation was not revealed to bidders and both participants had a calculator tool to determine the probability that an o¤er led to negative resale earnings for the responder. 2 5 While this breaks with design norms of changing one variable at a time, we purposefully chose to advance towards a more realistic resale setting rather than run two additional treatments (one that only allows players to chat and another that only allows them to make multiple o¤ers). 2 6 This was not an overly binding constraint. In the bargain treatment we observe 351 resale markets with 44 (12.5%) timing out before agreement was reached. In a large number of the cases, bidders made their …nal o¤ers with plenty of time remaining on the clock. We conjecture that this is evidence of resale failing because of a holdout strategy, rather than a binding time limit. 4 . Bargain: After the auction, if the weak bidder won a unit, both bidders were allowed to make and accept o¤ers and to communicate via anonymous computerized chat in an unstructured bargaining game. As in the incomplete information resale treatment, valuations were not revealed and participants had the calculator tool to facilitate decisions.
We conducted 3 sessions for each treatment yielding a total of 12 sessions with 16 participants in each session. The no resale, complete information resale, and incomplete information resale sessions each consisted of 30 periods. Since the resale stage of the bargain treatment required more time, each session of this treatment consisted of 20 periods. To ensure the least amount of changes possible we used the exact same value draws across treatments. In the no resale, complete information resale, and incomplete information resale treatments, the 16 subjects were divided into 2 groups for random rematching of partners in each period, leading to two independent groups in each session. In the bargain treatment, subjects were rematched within the entire group of 16 subjects to minimize the e¤ect of rematching with the same partner under free-form communication. Examining the chat, we …nd no evidence of collusion or reputation building.
The subjects were students at Florida State University and were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . All sessions were conducted at the xs/fs laboratory in March and June, 2011, and October, 2012. The experiment was programmed using Z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) , and prior to the beginning of the paid periods, all subjects were given instructions which in- 
Experimental Results
In this section, we describe the main results of our experiments. We begin in unit value in the four treatments, 28 with the relative frequency of bid/value combinations as the weighting factor. In the no resale treatment, it is apparent that strong bidders dropped out at low prices with higher frequency for values lower than 40. This is evidenced in two ways. First, we have larger clusters of zero bids for values below 40 and second, the number of observed bids is also much higher (showing that strong bidders dropped out …rst).
The remaining three graphs represent the resale treatments and provide visual evidence 2 8 The …gure only represents losing bids, since we do not observe a bidder's bid when he wins a unit in an ascending auction. 13 that strong bidders reduced demand much more often, responding as theoretically predicted in Result 2 to the presence of resale. Not only is the frequency of bids lower than values high throughout the resale treatments, but many of the bids are near the theoretical prediction of 0.
The bargain treatment appears to adhere most accurately to the point predictions of the model while stronger deviations from the point predictions are observed in both the complete and the incomplete information resale treatments.
To formally account for unobserved winning bids, Table 4 .1 presents marginal e¤ects from panel tobit regressions for strong bidders'bids, where unobserved bids are censored at the auction price at which the weak bidder dropped out. 29 The variable Period tracks the period of play.
The positive signi…cant coe¢ cient on v S > 40 across Models 1 and 2 con…rms that strong bidders bid higher when their value was higher than 40 in the no resale treatment, implying less demand reduction for bidders with relatively high values.
Empirical Result 1: Without resale, strong bidders bid more aggressively when v S > 40.
Examining the e¤ects of resale, we …nd partial support for the theoretical predictions. Lowvalue strong bidders are predicted to reduce demand regardless of the presence of resale, and di¤erences should emerge only for high values. In Model 1, the negative signi…cant coe¢ cients on the treatment variables indicate that in all resale treatments strong bidders bid less aggressively than without resale, even with low values. Including treatment interactions with v S > 40 in Model 2 demonstrates that the e¤ect continues at high-values, as predicted. However, these e¤ects are weaker for the incomplete information resale treatment. As we will show in Section 4.4, this is consistent with the fact that the resale market is less e¢ cient in the incomplete information resale treatment, thus making it more risky for strong bidders to reduce demand. 30 Empirical Result 2: With resale, strong bidders bid less aggressively than without resale, principally in the complete information and bargain resale treatments.
We also …nd a strong negative e¤ect on Period, suggesting that strong bidders were learning to reduce demand over time. To investigate learning e¤ects, Models 3 and 4 restrict the analysis 2 9 This is a censored normal regression model as the censoring point may change in each observation (Wooldridge, 2001 , where x k represents the k th independent variable. The numbers reported in parentheses are bootstrapped standard errors. Models 1 and 2, covering all treatments, include 1646 uncensored bids and 994 right-censored bids (at the auction price). The resale only models, 3 and 4, include 1358 uncensored bids and 562 right-censored bids.
3 0 Since strong bidders tended to bid higher in the incomplete information resale treatment than in the complete resale treatment, there is no evidence that they tried to signal lower valuations to weak bidders when valuations were not revealed after the auction, in order to obtain higher pro…t in the resale market. and strong negative e¤ect of past experience in resale on bids across all treatments, but this e¤ect is lessened in the incomplete information resale treatments.
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In theory, a strong bidder who reduces demand should drop out at zero. Yet any low bid that is below value or allows the weak bidder to win a unit may be interpreted as demand reduction. 31 Table 4 .2: Relative frequency of demand reduction by strong bidders (out of all auctions).
Since without demand reduction the weak bidder should never win, Table 4 .2 also reports the percentage of auctions where the weak bidder won a unit. In the no resale treatment, weak bidders won more often when strong bidders had low values. All resale treatments resulted in weak bidders winning more often than without resale. Omitting the …rst 10 periods to account for learning, we observe weak bidders winning even more often with resale, particularly in the complete information and bargain treatments.
As a robustness check for the results on demand reduction, we analyze the probability of the strong bidder winning both units in Table 4 .3 using probit regressions with standard errors clustered at the level of independent observation. While we only observe actual bids when the bidder drops out, whether or not the strong bidder won both units is always observed.
The negative coe¢ cients on all three resale treatment variables and the negative interactions of Comp and Incomp with the dummy indicating higher values provide additional evidence that demand reduction is more prominent with resale. The main di¤erence with the results in Table   4 .1 is that demand reduction is now more evident for low values in the incomplete information treatment.
Weak Type Bidding
By Results 1 and 2 in Section 2, the weak bidder should bid up to his valuation without resale, while he should bid more than his valuation in all resale treatments. Figure 4 .2 plots weighted scatterplots of weak bidders' bids, 32 with the relative frequency of bid/value combinations as 3 1 Of course, dropping out at a strictly positive price may not be an optimal strategy for a strong bidder, because conditional on the auction price being positive, the expected pro…t from reducing demand may be lower than the expected pro…t from outbidding the weak bidder. A positive auction price also generates an information spillover between the auction and the resale market. 3 2 The graphs for the complete information and bargain treatments contain fewer observations than the other treatments because weak bidders won more often. It is clear from the scatterplot that in the no resale treatment the majority of observed bids by weak bidders are equal to value. Quantifying this, we …nd that the mean absolute deviation of bid from value is 0.80 and 83% of observed bids fall within +/-2 of value. For a more accurate test of value bidding, we ran panel random e¤ects bid regression results on observed bids for the no resale treatment with standard errors clustered at the independent observation level. We …nd a constant coe¢ cient of 0:172 (p = 0:894) and coe¢ cient on v w of 0:982 (p < 0:001):
Supporting the theoretical prediction of value bidding, a joint test on the estimated coe¢ cients cannot reject the null that the constant is equal to zero and the coe¢ cient on the value of the weak bidder is 1 (p = 0:881). It is evident in the remaining scatterplots that the addition of resale changed bidding behavior. In the complete information and incomplete information treatments, the addition of a resale market increased bids by weak bidders. Using the 6 independent session averages per treatment, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test con…rms this di¤erence in observed bids between the no resale and complete information resale treatments (p = 0:037) and between the no resale and the incomplete information resale treatments (p = 0:078).
In the complete information and incomplete information resale treatments, many of the observed bids, while certainly higher than value, are lower than 30 -the lowest possible value of the strong bidder. A plausible explanation is that since weak bidders only had information regarding the competitor's value distribution, they may not have wanted to risk paying more than strong bidders' valuations. The …nal resale treatment, bargain, resulted in the majority of observed bids at value. 33 Bids appear to be less aggressive in this treatment than in other resale treatments, and a WMW test on session averages con…rms no di¤erence in observed bids between the no resale and the bargain resale treatment (p = 0:796). However, these scatterplots and tests on observed bids only represent partial results, as they focus on auctions where the weak bidder did not win a unit.
In Table 4 .4, we analyze weak bidding behavior through random e¤ects tobit models with bootstrapped standard errors, where unobserved winning bids are censored at the auction price.
The weak bidder's valuation is represented by v W . The …rst three models are run on all four treatments, with the no resale treatment serving as the baseline. Model 4 is restricted to the three resale treatments, with the complete information treatment serving as the baseline. 34 (1) regardless of the form, con…rming Result 2 and consistent with the results of Georganas (2011) and Georganas and Kagel (2011) for single-object auctions. While all three resale treatments result in speculation by weak bidders, the strength of this e¤ect is strongest in the complete information resale treatment. Model 4 con…rms that bids in the incomplete information and bargain treatments are lower than the complete information resale treatment, but this di¤erence is weaker in the bargain treatment. Models 1-3 include interaction e¤ects between value and treatments, and in all three models the signi…cant negative coe¢ cient on v W Bargain and v W Comp provides robust evidence that in these treatments higher-value weak bidders bid less aggressively than lower-value ones.
Empirical Result 4: Weak bidders bid higher with resale than without. Speculation by weak bidders is highest in the complete information resale treatment.
Models 2-4 include the behavioral variables. Period tests for general learning e¤ects, t 1
Resale tests for speci…c learning e¤ects related to previous experience in a resale market, and Balance tests for earnings e¤ects. In contrast to strong bidders, no signi…cant e¤ects were found. 35 By Result 3 in Section 2, auction e¢ ciency should be lower with resale than without, while …nal e¢ ciency should be 1 in the bargain and complete information resale treatments, and higher than without resale. Final e¢ ciency may be lower than 1 in the incomplete information resale treatments because bidders may fail to trade with take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers and incomplete information. information, consistent with Result 3. 36 Final e¢ ciency in both the bargain and the complete information resale treatments is higher than without resale. However, resale did not always yield higher …nal e¢ ciency: no signi…cant di¤erence exists between …nal e¢ ciency in the no resale and the incomplete information resale treatments (p = 0:521). complete information or bargaining, the second unit was almost always transferred to the strong bidder when the weak bidder won it in the auction, and there is no signi…cant di¤erence between the …nal allocations in these two treatments (K-S, p = 0:485). Resale under take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers with incomplete information also increased allocative e¢ ciency, but the …nal allocation was similar to the no resale allocation. A K-S test con…rms that there is no signi…cant di¤erence between the no resale and the incomplete information resale treatments (p = 0:485). lowest in the no resale and incomplete information resale treatments.
E¢ ciency and Seller' s Revenue
By Result 4 in Section 2, auction revenue should be higher without resale than with resale because resale induces demand reduction which reduces the auction price. Table 4 .5 reports average auction revenue per unit sold for each treatment and by the type of the auction winner. The highest overall revenue was achieved in the no resale treatment, but revenue in the incomplete information resale treatment was almost as high as in the no resale treatment. 37 The reason is that weak bidders bid more aggressively with resale, and this increased the seller's revenue when strong bidders chose to win both units in the auction rather than reduce demand.
Empirical Result 6:
The seller's revenue without resale is higher than in the bargain treatment, but it is not signi…cantly higher than in the incomplete information and in the complete information resale treatments. Table 4 .5 also shows that in all treatments the seller obtained a lower revenue when weak bidders won a unit, although strong bidders had a higher value. This is consistent with the fact that strong bidders tended to reduce demand and bid lower than weak bidders, in order to reduce the auction price.
Resale Market
In this section, we examine aspects of the resale market that underlie the empirical regularities described previously for the resale treatments. 38 Resale was more successful in the complete information resale and bargain treatments than in the incomplete information resale treatment because of the mix of incomplete information and a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er mechanism. The last two columns of Table   4 .6 report the share of the overall success rates by the type of proposer in the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er mechanisms and show that the majority of successful o¤ers were made by weak proposers, particularly in the incomplete information resale treatment. As expected, an increase in the o¤er made by a strong proposer as well as a reduction in the o¤er made by a weak proposer signi…cantly increased the probability of acceptance. We also …nd a signi…cant and large positive e¤ect of weak bidders assigned to the proposer role on the probability of agreement, arguably because weak bidders were less aggressive in the resale market, as we will show below. Although in theory the pro…ts from the auction should not a¤ect the resale market, in the incomplete information treatment we …nd some evidence of a strong positive e¤ect when the auction price was higher than the weak bidder's value. The size of the gains from trade v S v W had little impact under complete information, but signi…cantly increased the probability of successful resale in the incomplete information treatment.
Successful Resale
Model 3 considers the bargain treatment taking into account the unstructured process of this mechanism, where we typically observe a series of alternating o¤ers. To measure the initial level of disagreement in a bargaining pair, we include a variable equal to the di¤erence between the …rst o¤ers made by strong and weak bidders. 39 We …nd that each 1 unit increase in initial disagreement is associated with approximately 1% decrease in the probability of successful resale.
We also include a variable, # O¤ers Made, which tracks the total number of o¤ers made by a bargaining pair and …nd a negative e¤ect on the probability of …nal agreement. As in the incomplete information resale treatment, higher gains from trade increased the probability of successful resale.
Empirical Result 7:
Resale is more likely to succeed when the weak bidder has more bargaining power, with more information in the resale market, larger gains from trade, and a ‡exible bargaining mechanism. Table 4 .8 summarizes average resale prices, earnings (measured as the di¤erence between the resale price and the bidder's value), and proposed o¤ers by type of bidder. Resale prices were higher in the complete information resale treatment than either the bargain or the incomplete information resale treatments. WMW tests on the independent session averages for resale prices
show signi…cant di¤erences between complete information and incomplete information resale (p = 0:054) and between complete information resale and bargain (p = 0:020), but no signi…cant di¤erence between incomplete information resale and bargain (p = 0:796).
Weak bidders obtained a lower pro…t than strong bidders in the resale market, but less so with complete information, where pro…ts were closer to equal splits of the resale surplus.
Weak bidders earned 48% of the resale surplus in the complete information treatment, 30%
in the incomplete information treatment, and 39% in the bargain treatment. 40 Di¤erences in earnings were mainly driven by strong bidders making more aggressive o¤ers in the resale market, especially with incomplete information. Comparing the average o¤ers between the takeit-or-leave-it treatments, strong proposers made signi…cantly lower o¤ers under incomplete than under complete information (p = 0:006), while there is no signi…cant di¤erence between the weak proposers'o¤ers (p = 0:872).
"Weak proposers were consistently less aggressive than strong proposers in both treatments.
However, weak o¤ers were closer to optimal in the incomplete information treatment, and strong o¤ers were higher than optimal in the complete information treatment. In theory, the variance in o¤ers should be higher Figure 4 .4 compares the period averages of actual take-it-or-leave-it resale o¤ers by weak and strong bidders to optimal o¤ers (that maximize the expected pro…t of the proposer) in the complete and incomplete information resale treatments. 41 Weak proposers were consistently less aggressive than strong proposers in both treatments. However, weak o¤ers were closer to 3 9 If agreement was reached with a single o¤er, this di¤erence is de…ned as zero. 4 0 The resale treatments with take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers are ultimatum games and, in expectation, a bidder should obtain half of the gains from trade in the resale market. It is well-established that experimental tests of ultimatum games often result in substantially di¤erent behavior than predicted by theory: on average, o¤ers that are lower than 40% of the bargaining pie are typically rejected (Cooper and Dutcher, 2011) . Our results for the complete information treatment most closely conform to the standard results of ultimatum games. 4 1 With complete information, the optimal o¤er by a bidder is equal to the value of its competitor. With
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Resale Price Weak Earnings Strong Earnings Resale O¤er
Weak / Strong Comp Resale 29.56 (5.619) 9.45 (5.527) 10.20 (5.749) 32.47 (4.664) =25.45 (6.240) Incomp Resale 27.38 (7.686) 8.74 (7.964) 12.59 (7.635) 32.45 (6.911) =17.93 (7. optimal in the incomplete information treatment, and strong o¤ers were higher than optimal in the complete information treatment. In theory, the variance in o¤ers should be higher with complete information than with incomplete information, yet we observe the reverse. This is particularly true for strong bidders who made extremely low o¤ers in the early periods of the incomplete information treatment.
Comparing average resale prices from Table 4 .8 to average auction prices (which are equivalent to the seller's revenue) from Table 4 .5 it is clear that, in all treatments with resale, auction prices are lower than resale prices on average. Since resale tends to reduce the seller's revenue, it may be expected that bidders always prefer auctions with resale. This is not necessarily the case, however, as shown in Table 4 .9, which reports average total bidders'pro…ts -i.e., auction earnings plus resale earnings in each period -by types and treatments. Pairwise WMW tests on session averages …nd signi…cant earnings di¤erences for weak bidders across all treatments (p 0:077) except between the complete information resale and bargain treatments. Weak bidders obtain higher pro…ts when resale is allowed. By contrast, strong bidders'pro…ts without resale are signi…cantly lower than in the bargain treatment (p = 0:070), but are not signi…cantly di¤erent than in the complete information and incomplete information resale treatments (p 0:631). 42 Therefore, strong bidders obtain higher pro…ts when resale is allowed only when the resale market is su¢ ciently ‡exible and e¢ cient, so that they manage to trade with high probability after the auction. Table 4 .9: Average bidders'total pro…ts (standard deviations in parentheses).
incomplete information, the optimal o¤er by a weak bidder with value vW is equal to 25 + v W 2 , and the optimal o¤er by a strong bidder with value vS is equal to 5 + v S 2 . 4 2 The only other signi…cant di¤erence in the pairwise comparison of overall pro…ts for strong bidders is between incomplete information resale and bargain (p = 0:038). 
Conclusion
The possibility of resale a¤ects bidders' strategies in the auction and the seller's revenue. We use a combination of theory and controlled laboratory experiments to analyze the e¤ects of postauction resale and asymmetries among bidders in multi-object auctions, with varying information conditions and resale mechanisms.
Our experimental results provide strong qualitative support for the bidding strategies predicted by theory. First, without resale, bidders reduce demand less when they have a relatively higher valuation than competitors. Second, with resale, bidders who expect to sell in the resale market speculate by bidding higher than their valuations, while bidders who expect to buy in the resale market reduce demand much more often than without resale, especially when they have high valuations. So the possibility of resale motivates bidders to bid further away from their values. These results are robust to di¤erent resale mechanisms, but the magnitude of the response to resale depends on the properties of the resale market: higher uncertainty about the resale market's outcome reduces speculation and demand reduction.
Although resale increases e¢ ciency after the auction, our analysis shows that the increase in demand reduction due to the presence of resale reduces auction e¢ ciency, and may not 27 increase …nal e¢ ciency when resale fails because of incomplete information or a rigid bargaining environment. In any case, the potential e¢ ciency gains induced by resale come at the cost of the seller's revenue. Speci…cally, a highly e¢ cient resale market reduces revenue because it allows bidders to exploit mutual gains from trade after the auction.
We Thank you for participating in today's experiment. I will read through a script to explain to you the nature of today's experiment as well as how to work the computer interface you will be using. I will be using this script to make sure that all sessions of this experiment receive the same information, but please feel free to ask questions as they arise. We ask that everyone please refrain from talking or looking at the monitors of other subjects during the experiment.
If you have a question or problem please raise your hand and one of us will come to you. I also ask that you please turn o¤ your cell phones.
General information: The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation. You will receive $10 for showing up on time for the experiment. You will also make additional money during today's experiment. Upon completion of the experiment the amount that you make will be paid to you in cash. Payments are con…dential; no other participant will be told the amount you make. All amounts in this phase of the experiment are denominated in experimental currency units, ECUs. ECUs will transform into real dollars at the rate of $0.01 per ECU. These earnings are in addition to the show-up fee. In this experiment, you will be a bidder in a series of auctions. Please hit continue for general instructions. Please do not hit continue again until after I have …nished with all instructions for this screen.
In this experiment, we will create a market in which you will act as a bidder in a sequence of auctions. Each auction has two identical units of a hypothetical item for sale. You will be bidding in the auction against one other person. At the end of each auction there will be the possibility of the winner reselling the item to the other person. The person you are matched with to bid against will be randomly chosen at the start of each auction and will therefore be di¤erent across auctions. Each auction will always have two bidders: a 1-unit bidder and a 2-unit bidder. The 1-unit bidder can purchase only 1 unit of the item and will be assigned a single value for one (1) unit. The 2-unit bidder can purchase up to 2 units of the item and will be assigned a single value for each of the two (2) units. For both types of bidders, these values represent the value of the good to you -what we will pay you for any items purchased. Please hit continue for information on roles, values, and resale. Again, please do not hit continue until I have …nished with all instructions for this screen.
You were randomly assigned a role of 1-unit bidder or 2-unit bidder, which is listed at the top of your screen. The possible values for the 2-unit bidder are the integers between 30 and 50, with all values being equally likely, and the possible values for the 1-unit bidder are the integers between 10 and 30, again all values are equally likely. If you are a 1-unit bidder, you will be bidding against a 2-unit bidder and vice versa. If the 1-unit bidder purchases a unit, they will have the opportunity to resell it to the 2-unit bidder. If the 2-unit bidder purchases a unit, they will not resell it because they have a higher value than the 1-unit bidder. Please press continue again to work with the auction interface. What you should see is a ‡at example screen. Please do not hit continue until I have …nished with all instructions for this screen.
What you should see in front of you is a sample of the screen you will see for this auction. The left side of the screen contains boxes that have instructions and payo¤s. On the right side of the screen you will see the primary auction interface. Beside the word "Auction" in the top line, you will see the number of units you can win (called "Units Demanded"). Below that you will see what your value is for a unit in ECUs for this auction (remember your value is what we will pay you for each unit won). Underneath your value, you will see a bid clock. This clock shows the current price in the auction and will steadily count up. The clock is not increasing now, because this is just an example screen. If this were the actual auction, the clock would be ticking up by 1 ECU per second. Both bidders begin the round "in" the auction. As the price increases on the bid clock, you can click on the "Drop Out"button to drop out of the auction at any point of your choosing. Note that drop out choices are irreversible so as soon as any bidder presses the drop out button, the auction will end and the time on the clock will be the auction price. After the auction, there may be an opportunity for reselling the object.
Payo¤s: If the 1-unit bidder drops out …rst, the 2-unit bidder wins both units in the auction and there is no resale because the 2-unit bidder has the highest value. In this case, the 2-unit bidder will earn the di¤erence between their value and the auction price, for each unit. The 1-unit bidder will earn zero. If the 2-unit bidder drops out …rst, the 1-unit bidder wins one unit, and the 2-unit bidder also wins 1 unit. In this case, each bidder will earn the di¤erence between their value and the auction price for the unit they won. In addition, because the 2-unit bidder has the highest value, the 1-unit bidder will have the opportunity to resell the unit they won in the auction to the 2-unit bidder. Please press continue again to work with the resale interface.
Resale: If resale is possible because the 1-unit bidder won 1 unit, both bidders automatically enter the resale stage. What you should see in front of you is a sample of the screen you will see in resale. If you were a 1-unit bidder in the auction, you will always be the seller in the resale stage. If you were a 2-unit bidder in the auction, you will always be the buyer in the resale stage. These roles are now de…ned by the bolded sentence at the top left of the screen. If you are the buyer, you have the opportunity to purchase the 2nd unit from the seller and if you are the seller, you have the opportunity to sell the unit you won in the auction to the buyer. Immediately below this, you will see a reminder of your value for the unit and the range of potential values for the other resale participant you are bargaining with. Your value and the other participant's value remain identical to the values you both had in the auction stage. Immediately below this, still on the left side of the screen is the resale payo¤ information. For resale to occur, both the buyer and seller must agree to a resale o¤er. If they agree to a resale o¤er, the seller will earn the di¤erence between the resale price and their value. The buyer will earn the di¤erence between their value and the resale price. If no resale o¤er is agreed to, both the buyer and seller earn 0 in this stage. Any earnings from the resale stage are in addition to the earnings from the auction.
Resale o¤ers are made at the top right of the screen. To make an o¤er, type in the price you would like to o¤er into the blue box and click "Make O¤er." Once you make this o¤er, it will immediately appear in the box below under the label, "Your O¤er."Any o¤ers made by the other resale participant to you will also appear in this box on the right hand side. Please input any o¤er amount into the blue box and press "Make O¤er." You should see that your o¤er box has updated with the o¤er you input. You should also see the other participant's o¤er to you once they have made their o¤er. Please now input another o¤er and click "Make O¤er" to see that your o¤er has changed. To accept the o¤er of the other participant, click on their o¤er, which will highlight in blue and then click "Accept." You can only accept o¤ers made by the other participant. Currently, the Accept button is disabled because this is an example screen, but when either the buyer or seller agree to an o¤er by pressing this button, the resale stage will immediately terminate. Prior to agreement, o¤ers can be changed at anytime.
You have two tools to facilitate your resale decisions. The …rst is chat, located at the bottom right hand side of the screen. Messages can be sent to the other participant in this box. Please type a message now, for example, "hello" and press enter. You will see that your message has popped up and is identi…able by the label, "YOU." If your practice partner has also sent a message, that message should have popped-up in the box and is identi…able by their role of either BUYER or SELLER. Make sure that you hit enter after you have typed a message for it to be sent. We also ask that throughout the experiment you do not provide identi…able information about yourself to the other participant. In addition to chat, you will also have access to the scrollbar seen on the left side of the screen. You can use the scrollbar to determine your payo¤ for a given o¤er. The minimum possible resale o¤er is 10, and the maximum is 50. You can choose any resale price between these two values by sliding the scrollbar, or clicking on the right and left arrows, which will increase and decrease the resale price. Please move the scrollbar now. You should now see that information has appeared below the scrollbar, which will be automatically updated as you move the scrollbar. The resale o¤er is given directly below the scrollbar. Below the o¤er, you are given your resale pro…t for that given o¤er. Directly below your pro…t, you are given the probability that the other participant's resale pro…t will be positive for that particular o¤er. If you would like to exit resale, there is a button at the bottom left of the screen that you can click to choose to exit the resale stage at any time. You will have 180 seconds (3 minutes) to agree to an o¤er with the other participant. The time will be indicated in the middle of the right side of the screen, above chat. If an o¤er is not accepted either by you or the other participant before time expires, no resale will occur. Please press Exit Resale to continue.
Please follow along with example 1, as we go through a sample auction. Please note that this example is for explanatory purposes only and is not intended to suggest how you should make decisions. If you are a 1-unit bidder, your value is 25 and if you are the 2-unit bidder, your value is 35. In this example, the 1-unit bidder will drop out …rst at a price of 20, so the 2-unit bidder (who doesn't drop out) will win both units in the auction. We will now play this auction out. When you click continue, you will immediately be taken into the auction with the live bid clock. On the next screen, the 1-unit bidder should drop out when the auction price hits 20. The 2-unit bidder should not click the drop out button. Please click continue to enter the practice auction.
(Once in auction screen) You will now see the bid clock ticking up. The 1-unit bidder should press the drop out button once the bid clock has reached a price of 20. The 2-unit bidder should not click the drop out button.
(After 20 seconds and bidder has dropped out.) If you dropped out at a price other than 20, the computer assumed the drop out price was 20 for example purposes. You should now see that the auction has ended because the drop-out button disappeared. You will also be told of the auction price. Please click continue to be taken to the results summary.
You should now see the results screen for this practice auction. The 2-unit bidder won both units in the auction because the 1-unit bidder dropped out …rst. The 1-unit bidder did not win a unit. Since the 2-unit bidder won both units and has a higher value, there is no resale. Earnings for example 1: Notice that the auction price of the item is equal to the drop out price of 20 made by the 1-unit bidder. The 2-unit bidder won two units. For each unit, the 2-unit bidder's earnings are the di¤erence between their value, 35, and the auction price, 20, so the 2-unit bidder earns 15 for each unit and the total payo¤ for both units won is 30. The 1-unit bidder earns zero because they did not win a unit. Please click continue as we will now go through an example where the 2-unit bidder drops out …rst.
Example 2: Recall, if you are a 1-unit bidder your value for this example is 25 and if you are a 2-unit bidder your value is 35. In this example, the 2-unit bidder will drop out …rst at a price of 20, so the 1-unit bidder (who doesn't drop out) will win one unit in the auction and the 2-unit bidder will win the other unit. We will now play this auction out. When you click continue, you will be immediately taken into the auction with the live bid clock. On the next screen, the 2-unit bidder should drop out when the auction price hits 20. The 1-unit bidder should not click the drop out button. Please click continue to enter the next practice auction.
(Once in auction screen) Remember, the 2-unit bidder should try to drop out at a price of 20. The 1-unit bidder should not click the drop out button.
(After 20 seconds and bidder has dropped out) Again, if the 2-unit bidder dropped out at a price di¤erent from 20, the computer assumed a drop out of 20 for example purposes. The auction is now over, and since the 2-unit bidder dropped out …rst, the 2-unit bidder won one unit and the 1-unit bidder won one unit. Because the 2-unit bidder has the highest value, there will be a resale stage where the 1-unit bidder will have the opportunity to resell the item to the 2-unit bidder, but …rst you will be taken to an auction summary screen. Please click continue to be taken to the pre-resale auction results summary.
Both bidders won a unit in the auction and paid a price equal to the 2-unit bidder's drop out price of 20. The 1-unit bidder earned the di¤erence between their value, 25 and the price 20, for auction pro…t equal to 5. The 2-unit bidder earned the di¤erence between their value 35 and the price paid in the auction, 20, for auction pro…t equal to 15. This pre-resale results screen will also remind you of your role in resale. The 1-unit bidder is always the seller in the resale market, while the 2-unit bidder is always the buyer. Please click continue to be taken to resale stage.
Assume in the resale stage that both resale participants agree to a resale price of 32. To see how accepting an o¤er works, please input an o¤er of 32 and click "Make O¤er."Once the other participant has input a price of 32, you will see that update as well. To agree to the o¤er made by the other participant, click on the o¤er given. You will know you have selected the o¤er once it highlights in blue. During the actual paid resale games, you do not have to both input the same o¤er for resale agreement; this is only for practice purposes. Please note that either role can accept and make o¤ers, and it is only necessary for 1 o¤er to be made and accepted for resale to take place. After selecting the o¤er, click the "Accept" button. Once an accept decision is made, resale ends and you should be now taken to the results screen.
You should now see the results screen which summarizes your auction pro…t at the top and your resale pro…t at the bottom. The seller's resale pro…t is 7, which is the di¤erence between the resale price, 32, and their value, 25. The buyer's resale pro…t is 3, which is the di¤erence between their value, 35, and the resale price, 32. Total earnings are equal to auction pro…t plus resale pro…t.
Last informational points: Note that it is possible to lose money in the auction or in resale. The 2-unit bidder loses money if they purchase a unit at a price that is higher than their value. The 1-unit bidder loses money if they purchase a unit in the auction but the resale price is lower than the auction price. You will all begin this phase of the experiment with a balance of 150 ECUs. This balance will increase as you make pro…ts and decrease when you make losses. Should you lose enough money that this balance becomes negative; you will be reset with your initial balance once, and continue participating. If you go bankrupt a second time, you will be removed from the experiment and paid your show-up fee only. Ties: If both bidders dropped out at the exact same time, the computer will randomly select a winner to break the tie. Random Groups: You will be randomly re-assigned to a new group each period. There will always be two people in your group, and the other bidder will be the opposite role. At some point, because of the software, we may have a group …nish before another. This does not imply any advantage 37 in payments and we ask that you please wait patiently for the others to …nish. Please press Continue.
We are now about to take a short quiz to ensure you understand the instructions. When you have …nished the quiz, please press continue again to check your answers. If you have an incorrect answer for one of the questions, a pop-up will notify you which question was answered incorrectly. Please correct your incorrect answer and hit continue again until all questions have been answered correctly. Once everyone has completed this quiz, the experiment will continue. (After Quiz) Are there any questions? We are about to begin the actual auctions that you will be paid for. Before each auction round, you will see this pause screen which will inform you of your value for the next round. You will now begin the paid rounds. You are participating at your own pace. Please follow the on-screen instructions. Please also make sure that when a continue button is available, you click it whenever you are ready so the experiment can continue. 
